SEC.00// what you are looking at

Is this really the issue Daily Bread published?

Every language edition of Issue №1 is signed with a key kept off the web server, recorded in an append-only transparency log, and pinned to a public anchor. This page checks all of that live, in your browser, for all sixteen editions. Nothing here can make an article true; it can only prove the words are the ones that were published, and that the edit history is complete.

Publisher identity & log stateRL-VER-001

Publisher key: …
Log key: …
Tree size: …
Root (SHA-256): …
Public anchor: …

Pin the publisher fingerprint above by comparing it with a copy you got somewhere other than this website — a printed masthead, a verified profile. On your first visit, a key fetched from this site alone proves nothing about who runs it.

SEC.01// the sixteen editions

Verifying…

Click any edition to see all seven checks. Each proof bundle is a self-contained proof.json you can download and verify offline.

One caveat on the last check. It compares the bytes served to you right now against the bytes that were signed, so it only holds if nothing between the publisher and you rewrites the page. A CDN that injects its own markup — analytics, bot-detection, an optimiser — changes those bytes on every request, and this check will report a mismatch it cannot distinguish from tampering. The first six checks are unaffected: they are made against the signed bundle, not the network.

SEC.02// what this proves, and what it does not

Defended

Tampering by anyone who is not the publisher — a hacked host, a bad CDN edge, a poisoned cache, an intercepting proxy. None hold the publisher key.
Silent revision by the publisher: a corrected edition supersedes the old one, but the old one stays in the log forever.
Backdating: the publish time is inside the signature and the anchored tree head fixes it in real time.

Not defended

A publisher who lies from the start. A signed fabrication is still a fabrication; signing attests authorship, not accuracy.
This badge, against the publisher. It ships from the same site as the magazine. The real check is the offline verifier below.
Theft of the publisher key, and anything a court can compel. Cryptography does not reach those.

SEC.03// verify it yourself, offline

The honest check is one you run with a verifier you did not get from us, against a fingerprint you obtained elsewhere. It needs only Python 3 — no packages to install.

curl -O https://db.ripostelabs.xyz/verify/verify_standalone.py
curl -O https://db.ripostelabs.xyz/.well-known/newsproof/publisher-key.json
curl -O https://db.ripostelabs.xyz/.well-known/newsproof/log-key.json
curl -O https://db.ripostelabs.xyz/.well-known/newsproof/anchors.jsonl
curl -O https://db.ripostelabs.xyz/.well-known/newsproof/consistency.json
curl -O https://db.ripostelabs.xyz/.well-known/newsproof/proofs/en.proof.json

python3 verify_standalone.py en.proof.json \
    --publisher-key publisher-key.json --log-key log-key.json \
    --anchors anchors.jsonl --consistency consistency.json

The log's leaves are served in full at /.well-known/newsproof/leaves.jsonl. Anyone can mirror them and check, over time, that history was only added to and never rewritten. A log nobody mirrors is a log that could quietly be replaced; please mirror it.